Suchergebnisse

Judging is difficult. This is obviously so in cases where the law is unclear or the facts are uncertain. But even in those cases where the law is as clear as it can be, and where the relevant facts have been fully developed, judges might still have difficulty getting it right. Why do judges misjudge? Judges, I will argue, possess three sets of "blinders": informational blinders, cognitive blinders, and attitudinal blinders. These blinders make adjudication on the merits - by which I mean the accurate application of governing law to the facts of the case - difficult. This difficulty, in turn, has important implications for disputants and their lawyers for it bears directly on the choice of dispute-resolution forum. In Part I of this paper, I will develop the positive argument that judges sometimes misjudge due to these three sets of blinders. To do so, I will rely largely on experimental research from psychology and empirical research from political science. Having developed the positive argument in Part I, I will turn to the prescriptive argument in Part II. There, I will explore the forum-selection implications of misjudging - namely, I will argue that the risk of misjudging suggests that various alternative dispute resolution processes, for different reasons and in different ways, might serve disputants better than adjudication.

To understand how people behave in an uncertain world - and to make viable recommendations about how the law should try to shape that behavior - legal scholars must employ a model or theory of decision making. Only with an understanding of how people are likely to respond to legal rules can legal scholars, judges, legislators, and regulators craft rules that are likely to encourage desirable behavior and discourage undesirable behavior. Rather than rely on rational choice theory, behavioral law and economics scholars (or legal decision theorists) have turned to Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky's "prospect theory" to inform their analyses of law and legal behavior. Prospect theory contains several empirical propositions relevant to legal analysis, but this paper focuses primarily on prospect theory's insight that people often make risk-averse choices when selecting between "gains" and risk-seeking choices when selecting between "losses." The paper surveys efforts in the legal literature to use this insight to inform the way legal scholars think about law and behavior in several doctrinal areas. The paper acknowledges some limitations associated with this work (e.g., external validity, differences in individual decision making, differences in group vs. individual decision making), but it concludes that prospect theory is nonetheless a valuable tool for legal scholars and policy makers.

Professor Deborah Hensler tells an important cautionary tale about mandatory mediation in her thoughtful and provocative contribution to this volume. In Suppose It's Not True: Challenging Mediation Ideology, Hensler observes that courts are now requiring litigants to mediate civil cases "on the grounds that litigants prefer [mediation] to traditional litigation," yet there is "a long line of social psychological research on individuals' evaluations of different dispute resolution procedures" consistent with the "idea that litigants might prefer adversarial litigation and adjudication" to mediation.' Hensler acknowledges that "some experimental research has found that subjects prefer mediation," but she argues that "the empirical work to date [does not] provide strong support for the notion that civil disputants prefer mediation to adversarial litigation and adjudication."

Riskin's categorization of mediation has engendered much debate among academics and practitioners. Although most in the mediation community accept Riskin's positive assertion that mediation as currently practiced includes both facilitation and evaluation, a vocal group of purist critics rejects Riskin's pluralist view of mediation on normative grounds. These purist critics -- including such prominent mediator-scholars as Professors Kim Kovach, Lela Love," and Josh Stulberg -- argue that mediation is in fact, and should be, solely a facilitative process "designed to capture the parties' insights, imagination, and ideas that help them to participate in identifying and shaping their preferred outcomes." For the purists, evaluation has no place in mediation." I do not seek in this article to add my voice to the chorus debating the relative merits of the pluralist and purist approaches to mediation. Instead, despite my belief that the pluralists win this debate as both a positive and normative matter, I intend to imagine for purposes of this article that the purists actually prevail upon state legislatures, regulators, mediation trainers, and members of the mediation community at large to mandate a purely facilitative approach to mediation. Having successfully conjured up an image of this purely facilitative mediation world, I then seek to make the impertinent claim that mediation is highly unlikely to be a purely facilitative process as long as lawyers serve as mediators.

During the past fifteen years, the alternative dispute resolution movement has greatly altered the legal landscape. Courts, legislatures and administrative agencies have enacted more than 2000 laws dealing with mediation and other dispute resolution processes. The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) and the American Bar Association Section of Dispute Resolution have recently formed a unique partnership to assess whether a model or uniform mediation statute might remedy some of the problems caused by the current patchwork of often confusing and conflicting mediation laws. The task of drafting a comprehensive mediation statute poses many challenges. The drafters must consider a number of criteria, e.g., efficiency, efficacy and justice, and a number of constituencies, e.g., parties, attorneys and the judicial system, when crafting the provisions of the act. Our task in this article is to focus on one criterion, satisfaction, and one constituency, parties. We approach this task with two modest goals. First, we hope to provide a clear and concise understanding of the factors that promote party satisfaction with mediation. Thus, in the first part of this article, the "understanding" part, we review the empirical research on party satisfaction and propose three sets of factors that affect it: party expectations, process factors and outcome factors. Second, we hope to provide the drafters with guidance on how they might draft provisions to promote party satisfaction. Thus, in the second part of this article, the "promoting" part, we examine, by way of example, how the drafters might craft three statutory provisions in light of the factors we have identified.

Article III is odd. In contrast to Articles 12 and II, which specify in some detail how the legislative and executive branches are to be assembled, Article III says virtually nothing about the institutional design of the Supreme Court. Consistent with this Constitutional silence, the Court's look, shape, and behavior have adapted to changed circumstances. For example, the Court's membership has changed substantially. Initially, six Justices sat on the Court; in time, the Court grew to ten and shrank to seven. Only in 1869 did it settle at nine. Likewise, the Court's jurisdiction has changed, first expanding, then contracting, and then shifting. The Court's caseload, which is now almost entirely discretionary, was once almost entirely mandatory. And the Court has altered its courtroom practices in a variety of ways; for instance, the Court once allowed advocates, who rarely submitted briefs, to present oral arguments that lasted for days! These examples tell us something important about the past, present, and future of the Supreme Court. The current Court may consist of nine members who decide a small number of discretionary appeals en banc, but this was not always so, nor need it be so in the future. So, in light of the many important roles the Court plays in our constitutional democracy, how should it conduct its affairs? In this Essay-the first in a series of essays designed to reimagine the Supreme Court-we argue that Congress should authorize the Court to adopt, in whole or part, panel decisionmaking. We recognize, of course, that this proposal is likely to elicit a visceral reaction. If your politics skew left, you might tremble at the thought of Justices Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas deciding Grutter, or Justices White and Rehnquist deciding for a divided panel that a woman does not have the right to choose. If your politics skew right, you might fear a world in which the "inconvenient truth" is not an Academy Award-winning documentary, but rather a decision by Justices Stevens, Souter, and Ginsburg to send ...

In contrast to the Supreme Court, which typically reverses the cases it hears, the United States Courts of Appeals almost always affirm the cases that they hear. We set out to explore this affirmance effect on the U.S. Courts of Appeal by using insights drawn from law and economics (i.e., selection theory), political science (i.e., attitudinal theory and new institutionalism), and cognitive psychology (i.e., heuristics and biases, including the status quo and omission biases).

Due process requires courts to make decisions based on the evidence before them without regard to information outside of the record. Skepticism about the ability of jurors to ignore inadmissible information is widespread. Empirical research confirms that this skepticism is well founded. Many courts and commentators, however, assume that judges can accomplish what jurors cannot. This Article reports the results of experiments we have conducted to determine whether judges can ignore inadmissible information. We found that the judges who participated in our experiments struggled to perform this challenging mental task. The judges had difficulty disregarding demands disclosed during a settlement conference, conversation protected by the attorney-client privilege, prior sexual history of an alleged rape victim, prior criminal convictions of a plaintiff, and information the government had promised not to rely upon at sentencing. This information influenced judges' decisions even when they were reminded, or themselves had ruled, that the information was inadmissible. In contrast, the judges were able to ignore inadmissible information obtained in violation of a criminal defendant's right to counsel and the outcome of a search when determining whether probable cause existed. We conclude that judges are generally unable to avoid being influenced by relevant but inadmissible information of which they are aware. Nevertheless, judges displayed a surprising ability to do so in some situations.

In contrast to the Supreme Court, which typically reverses the cases it hears, the United States Courts of Appeals almost always affirm the cases that they hear. We set out to explore this affirmance effect on the U.S. Courts of Appeal by using insights drawn from law and economics (i.e., selection theory), political science (i.e., attitudinal theory and new institutionalism), and cognitive psychology (i.e., heuristics and biases, including the status quo and omission biases).

In twenty-five different experiments conducted on over 2,200 judges, we assessed whether judges' political ideology influences their resolution of hypothetical cases. Generally, we found that the political ideology of the judge matters, but only very little. Across a range of bankruptcy, criminal, and civil cases, we found that the aggregate effect of political ideology is either nonexistent or amounts to roughly onequarter of a standard deviation. Overall, the results of our experiments suggest that judges are not "politicians in robes."

In twenty-five different experiments conducted on over 2,200 judges, we assessed whether judges' political ideology influences their resolution of hypothetical cases. Generally, we found that the political ideology of the judge matters, but only very little. Across a range of bankruptcy, criminal, and civil cases, we found that the aggregate effect of political ideology is either nonexistent or amounts to roughly one quarter of a standard deviation. Overall, the results of our experiments suggest that judges are not "politicians in robes."